5月8日日内瓦中美驻WTO父亲使激辩实录(中英文版)

  原题目:5月8日日内瓦中美驻WTO父亲使激辩实录(中英文版)

  

  世贸布匹局尽理事会中美分辨实录

  (2018年5月8日日内瓦)

  2018年5月8日,世贸布匹局尽理事会召开年内第二次会,中方提出产叁项议题:上诉机结合员遴选、美国在“232章”下对钢铝产品的主意、美国《1974年贸善法》“301章”。

  议题壹:上诉机结合员遴选

  张向早父亲使发言:

  感谢主席先生。即席同事,上半天好。

  比值先,我想递送佩行将退任的瑞典父亲使和印尼父亲使,祝福他们不到来所拥有顺顺手。我也要乐当着新同事,特佩是美国父亲使丹尼斯·谢伊。在此雕刻个关键时辰,成员们对你拥有很多收听候。期望你的过到来能给世贸布匹局带到来好运。

  此雕刻是中国要寻求列入尽理事会叁项议程中的第壹项。在谈到此雕刻个本题之前,我想说皓壹下,为什么中国要提出产此雕刻叁项议程。

  比值先,我想指出产的是,世贸布匹局正面对严峻应敌。

  中国在本次尽理事会程中参加以叁项议程,区别是新上诉机结合员遴选,美国在“232章”下对钢铝产品的主意,以及美国《1974年》贸善法“301章”。我们聚焦此雕刻些效实的缘由很骈杂,即世贸布匹局己1995年代男立以后到,在走度过23年后,正面对绝后应敌。世贸布匹局当今要回应的最紧迫和最顺顺手的效实是何以应对单边主义和贸善维养护主义。

  在乌弹奏圭回合之前,关贸尽协议缔结方深受单边主义和维养护主义主意的严重挟持。为了遏止其散开,成员交涉臻了《争端处理谅解》(DSU)和其他各项世贸协议。世贸布匹局规则避免避免成员采取单边举触动和贸善维养护主义主意,此雕刻些曾经结合多边贸善体制最要紧的基础和维养护世贸布匹局正日运转的中心。美国遏止新上诉机结合员遴选,征伸国际法的“232章”采取贸善限度局限主意,在“301章”下挟持对到来己中国的500亿美元出口产产品加以征关税。就中任何壹项举触动,若不如时处理,邑将严重影响世贸布匹局的正日运转,甚到使之堕入瘫痪,而当今世贸布匹局面对的是“叁重打击”的冲锋。

  故此,我们要寻求将叁项议题同时列入本次尽理事会程。中方期望与成员壹道讨论应对此雕刻些严重应敌。世贸成员该当壹道竭力,维养护规则与次第,维养护成员对等权利,维养护国际法尊荣,使世贸布匹局的规则体系违反掉落装置靖和完备,备止单边主义和贸善维养护主义破开变质多边贸善体制和对国际贸善形成烦扰。

  关于此次会议程第4项,我想指出产的是,世贸布匹局的“皇冠上的皓珠”正违反掉落它的光辉。

  群所周知,迅快处理成员间的贸善争端对世贸布匹局的拥有效运转到关要紧。世贸布匹局争端处理机制被誉为多边贸善体制“皇冠上的皓珠”。己1995年世贸布匹局成立以后到,世贸争端处理机制已处理了数佰宗贸善争端,成为国际法上效力最高,最拥有效的争端处理机制。上诉机构裁剪判关于确保世贸规则的不符性和却先见性发挥动了要紧干用。

  以后,世贸争端处理机制正面对己其成立以后到最为困苦的时辰,上诉机构的7位成员但拥有4位在任。假设不能展触动新上诉机结合员遴选,上诉机构将堕入瘫痪,整顿个争端处理机制将堕入危急。假设世贸终极违反掉落争端处理此雕刻壹干用,世贸规则将无法违反掉落拥有效实行,世贸布匹局的威信和名音将遭到伤害。终极,我们将无法拥有效制条约单边主义和贸善维养护主义。

  我们剩意到,美国曾累次表臻对世贸布匹局争端处理机制的关怀。中国认为,当前世贸布匹局争端处理机制尽体运转良好,而美国正是争端处理机制的首要讨巧方。

  任何成员的关怀邑该当活贸布匹局框架下经度过协商、讨论加以以处理,中国情愿主动参加以此雕刻壹效实的讨论。条是,我们顶持美国将其关怀与上诉机结合员遴选挂钩。

  世贸布匹局下的“成员驱触动”,并匪是“壹个”成员的驱触动。美国绑票上诉机构遴选以次,是对所拥有成员协商不符决策机制的泛用。我们号召吁末了尾展触动遴选以次,以便上诉机构尽快恢骈正日运干。

  感谢主席先生!

  (中方发言后,墨正西哥、柬埔寨、津巴布匹韦、俄罗斯、洪邑弹奏斯、乌干臻、日本、玻利维亚、坦桑尼亚、卡塔尔、贝宁、几内亚、土耳其、挪威、中国香港、巴正西、委内瑞弹奏、加以拿父亲、巴基斯坦、马尔代丈夫、瑞士、澳父亲利亚、缅甸、泰国、利比里亚、厄瓜多尔、哈哈萨克斯坦、印度、斯里兰卡、危地马弹奏、韩国、埃及接踵发言,照顾中方关怀。)

  谢伊父亲使发言:

  美国很快乐无时间在本议题下讨论处理对世贸布匹局争端处理机制运转的关怀,特佩是对上诉机构的关怀。

  我们剩意到提出产此项议题的成员和其他成员表臻的关怀。我愿借此雕刻间信皓伸见壹下美公营脚点,并收听候与即席同事就此雕刻些要紧效实持续终止讨论。

  该布匹局的成员喜乐咏赞世贸布匹局为遵循法治水的国际模范。确实,带拥有对美国到来说,世贸布匹局的规则确实具拥有要紧价,信守此雕刻些规则尽体上为全球经济波举止出产了贡献。

  条是,当该体系中担负裁剪成规则的人如此顽强且持续地忽视该机制的规则的时分,此雕刻壹体系的某些方面便出产即兴了严重错误。从根本上说,我们必须处理的效实是,我们对上诉机构的相信正逐步地被破开裂。相信被破开裂已使整顿个争端处理机制无法违反掉落政治水上的顶持。固然我的多位前任积年到来壹直在提出产正告,带拥有前尽科员在内的到来己世贸布匹局的音响也在表臻担心,上诉机构不单重写了我们的协议,对我们此雕刻些成员强大加以了不经度过交涉也不赞同接受的新的实体工干规则,同时,上诉机构还忽视或改写了争端处理制度的规则,从而扩展了该机构本身权限,以便创制和强大加以新的规则。

  关于那些坦比值不清雅察该制度何以运转的人到来说,(上诉机构)此雕刻种不经同意地违反即兴拥有规则、创制新规则的做法是露而善见的。干为世贸布匹局成员,我们成员经度过交涉并经国际同意的世贸规则皓白规则,上诉机构必须在90天内做出产决议.对此没拥有拥有干出产却以例外面的规则。条是,上诉机构于今信直从不信守度过此雕刻壹限期,在不得到其老板.即我们,尽理事会和争端处理机构(DSB)所拥有成员同意的情景下,违反了上述规则。异样,在争端处理谅解(DSU)没拥有拥有供任何根据的情景下,上诉机构就做出产决议,却以让壹个“不又是上诉机结合员”的人持续被视干该机结合员。

  此雕刻么的例儿子我却以举出产很多。

  摒除了违反规范其活触动的规则外面,上诉机构在还干出产了壹系列令人不装置的、普遍的章说皓,此雕刻种说皓淡色上发皓了新的世贸布匹局法度,而此雕刻项本能机能很清楚专属于成员经度过交涉行使。

  条是,我们在交涉方面缺乏半途而废与此雕刻种思惟方法之间存放在着亲稠密的相干。好多成员认为,经度过诉讼而匪经度过艰辛交涉最轻善得到某些结实。

  壹些成员认为美国当今正采取壹些举触动具拥有破开变质性。美国之因此此雕刻么做,是美国在积年正告不违反掉落关怀后产生的结实。了松此雕刻壹点很要紧。异样要紧的是,要知道,争端处理机制忽视即兴拥有规则和撰写新规则的做法,会削绵软弱世贸布匹局干为交涉和讨论效实论坛的干用。同时,争端处理机制跨越即兴拥有规则的做法,并没拥有拥有得到成员的同意,也不会得到帮言堂上的合法性或顶持。了松此雕刻壹点也很要紧。我们的目的是,确保任何争端处理机制邑能违反掉落所拥有成员的顶持。任何试图经度过补养充上诉机结合员空缺、以期延伸上诉机构当前匪正日运转情景的祈求,我们认为邑无助于推向完成上述目的。

  议题二: 美国在“232章”下对钢铝产品的主意

  张向早父亲使发言:

  感谢主席先生。

  中方重申3月7日尽理事会上的发言,对美国的“232章”主意深表忧虑。该主意严重扰骚触动国际贸善,伤害多边贸善体制,具拥有清楚的轻视性,同时严重缺乏透皓度。

  条是,美国不顾诸多成员皓白顶持,在上次尽理事会的次日,即3月8日决议对出口产钢铁和铝产品区别征收25%和10%的额外面关税。该主意不单伤害了出口产方的利更加,同时严重扰骚触动了即兴存放的钢铁和铝产品国际贸善次第。

  中国在4月5日向美国提宗了《争端处理谅解》项下的商量央寻求。此雕刻不单是为了维养护中国本身的出口产利更加,更是为了养保卫世贸布匹局的根本绳墨和价。在我们看到来,美国“232章”主意并匪基于“国度装置然”的考虑,而是为了维养护其国际产业,淡色上结合了《保障主意协议》项下的保障主意,该当适宜该协议下规则的必要环境。

  根据美国商政部的考查报告和美国国备部的数据,我们却以清楚地看到,“232章”主意根本不是为了维养护所谓“国度装置然”。美国国备工业需寻求的钢铁但占其国际消费量的3%,

  而美国国际钢铁产量占其国际消费量的84%,是其国备工业需寻求的28倍。出口产量但占其国际消费量的16%,而出口产量中的接近70%到来己得到美国临时或永世避免去的成员。也坚硬是说,“232章”主意真正限度局限的出口产但占美国国际钢铁消费量的5%摆弄。同时,美方的考查报告也没拥有拥有提及此雕刻些受到限度局限的出口产钢铁能否与其国备工业需寻求拥关于。

  这么,我们要讯问,此雕刻些但占美国国际市场5%的出口产钢铝—-据我们了松其绝全片断是普畅通的中低端产品,为什么会影响美国的国度装置然?假设说钢铁和铝产品事关国度装置然,这么从农产品、所产品、纺织品到高科技产品,拥有哪壹类产品与“国度装置然”没拥有拥有相干?假设偏偏占国际市场5%的出口产普畅通钢铝产品邑会挟持到“国度装置然”,我们不得不假定此雕刻个超级父亲国的“国度装置然”是什分绵软绵软弱虚绵软弱的,这么多父亲比例的出口产关于“国度装置然”才是“装置然”的?假设根据此雕刻么的“国度装置然”考查提高关税是合法的,这么关税减让表还拥有没拥有拥有条约束。

  我们还剩意到,美国在与其他成员的避免去交涉中寻寻求世贸规则避免避免的“己愿出口产限度局限”。据报道,5月1日,白宫贸善顾讯问纳瓦罗称,“所拥有避免去于额外面关税的国度或实体,邑必须接受配额以及其他为了维养护国度装置然、维养护钢铁和铝产业避免受出口产冲锋所必须的限度局限主意。”此雕刻清楚是违反世贸布匹局规则的。让全球贸善回到配额时代,此雕刻露然是在开历史倒腾车。

  中方号召吁所拥有成员壹道促使美方信守世贸布匹局工干,即雕刻吊销对钢铁和铝产品实施的“232章”主意,维养护正日的国际贸善次第。

  感谢主席先生。

  谢伊父亲使发言:

  主席先生,美国对中国要寻求将此项议题列入皓天会议程感触零数异。

  鉴于,雄心上,假设不是中国出产于本身利更加所创制的政策形圆成球父亲规模钢铁和铝产能度过剩,当前的情景也不会突发。此雕刻项政策曾经在忽视对全球形成影响的情景下实施积年,中国对时时添加以担心的回应父亲多是空谈,并不采取太多举触动。

  在此雕刻种背景下,中国当前宣示它是讨巧者,对此我们感触不松。无论何以,我很快乐无时间请成员们壹道回顾壹下美国维养护要紧国度装置然利更加的根本缘由。

  美国此前向成员畅通牒度过美国尽统根据修订后的《1962年美国贸善扩张法》第232条颁布匹的公报。

  我们不会重骈我们在此效实上的先立脚点,但请成员拜见我们在3月23日商品贸善理事会上的发言,该发言与1982年11月30日关于 GATT第21条的 GATT理事会的决议相不符。

  己那以后,壹些成员就尽统公报要寻求与美国终止商量。此雕刻些成员违反掉落了我们的回应。

  我们剩意到壹些成员祈求以适宜他们祈求的方法到来松读尽统公报,试图借此到来诉诸 WTO特定章。此雕刻些祈求没拥有拥有根据,我们不会任他们胆大妄为。

  在尽统规律、拥损害的国度干涉、市场诬蔑和在某些经济体中存放在的微少量持续的产能度过剩等方面,我们情愿和任何(对上述)拥有效实的成员展开讨论,此雕刻些邑需寻求(我们)采取举触动。

  根据美国《1962年贸善扩张法案》第232条,尽统颁布匹了钢铁和铝的公报,决定拥有必要经度过关税对挟持美国国度装置然的出口产钢铁和铝产品终止调理。

  美国没拥有拥有根据《1974年贸善法》的第201条采取举触动,该贸善法是美国实施保障主意的法度。我们近日到对(出口产)太阳能产品和父亲型家用洗衣机的畅通牒坚硬是证皓,美国充分观点到什么结合保障主意及《保障主意协议》规则的畅通牒工干。

  余外面,《保障主意协议》第12.3条规则,“建议实施或延伸保障主意的成员应向干为拥关于产品的出口产方对其拥有淡色利更加的成员供事前商量的充分时间”。条是,美国并不是对钢铁或铝提出产“实施或延伸保障主意”,故此,第12.3条不使用。中国根据该协议第12.3条提出产的商量央寻求,如其对关税的初步描绘,在《保障主意协议》中没拥有拥有任何根据。

  鉴于我们对钢铁和铝的(232)主意不是保障主意,故此,美国认为《保障主意协议》第8·2条不能成为中国停顿关税减让或其他工干的根据。中国对其主意没拥有拥有援用任何其他说辞,美国也认为中国的主意没拥有拥有任何其他根据。故此,中国的做法看宗到来没拥有拥有世贸规则根据。

  (中美发言后,南匪、俄罗斯、巴正西、乌干臻、委内瑞弹奏、古巴、玻利维亚、日本、卡塔尔、巴基斯坦、柬埔寨、欧盟、土耳其、瑞士、中国香港、印度、挪威接踵发言,谴贵单边主义和维养护主义。)

  张向早父亲使发言:

  主席先生,我想就“232章”主意与“产能度过剩”的相干发表发出产评论。在此之前,我要就之前的讨论做两点回应。

  第壹,“232章”主意属于保障主意。

  从美国商政部关于钢铁和铝产品“232章”主意的考查报告以及尽统告示到来看,其内在逻辑是清楚的:出口产产品持续增长,对国际产业形成严重伤害,故此要对到来己全世界的出口产产品采取加以征额外面关税的主意。在我们看到来,此雕刻壹内在逻辑与《1994年关贸尽协议》第19条和《保障主意协议》关于保障主意的定义和实施环境的规则相符。

  第二,中国提出产的停顿减让主意适宜世贸规则。

  中方根据《保障主意协议》第8条和《1994年关贸尽协议》第19.3条的规则,在深延会形成难以弥补养的伤害的紧急情景下,于3月29日向商品贸善理事会畅通牒了相应的停顿减让主意,并于4月2日末了尾实施。

  在实体方面,中方严峻遵循了《保障主意协议》第8.2条关于停顿减让应与保障主意“淡色相当”的规则。我们采取的主意是对称、拥有节制的。

  主席先生,中方将“232章”主意列为讨论议题不是为了本身利更加,而是为了整顿个多边贸善体制。

  拥有报还了摆脱孤立和转变矛盾,试图确立此雕刻么壹种逻辑:贸善维养护主义主意源于世界产能度过剩,产能度过剩源于中国的补养助,故此该当联顺手向中国施压。露然,此雕刻种逻辑是不成立的。中国尽体上处于全球价链的中低端,很父亲程度上根据跨国公司的订单,为目的市场加以工消费所需产品。2008年以后到,中国内阁采取了主动的财政政策和钱币政策,扩展投资,为援救金融危急做出产了庞父亲贡献,违反掉落了很多国度的赞美。当今,时度过境迁移,壹些国度走上骈苏路途,当年扩展的产能却已找不到世界市场的需寻求。为了消募化当年装置抚政策的结实,中国内阁和人民正接受着庞父亲的调理的疾苦,不成胜于数的工人违反掉落了工干,但我们依然在力所能及的环境下竭力增添度过剩产能。而壹些健忘者却把世界性的产能度过剩委过行于中国。

  我们情愿和其他世贸成员活贸布匹局框架下讨论何以使世贸规则更其顺应新的情势,更好地维养护公允靠边的国际贸善次第。但我不赞同恣意给中国扣上几顶帽儿子,把中国的展开战微描绘成诬蔑世界市场。此雕刻完整顿不快宜雄心,在以后贸善维养护主义流行壹代的情景下,中国更是壹个错误的攻击目的。

  感谢主席先生。

  议题叁 美国《1974年贸善法》“301章”

  张向早父亲使发言:

  主席先生,世贸成员对美国《1974年贸善法》“301章”不该感触陌生。雄心上,己1974年以后到,美国曾对35个国度和地区发宗125宗“301章”考查。此雕刻段历史并不久远,在座好多人对此雕刻些考查的破开变质性该当蜻蜓点水。

  重温历史。世贸布匹局成立后,关于“301章”国曾允诺言,不会在没拥有拥有争端处理机构裁剪判的情景下,单边运用“301章”则美国将担负国度责。当今美国忽视此雕刻些允诺言,发表发出产将对中方采取父亲规模制裁剪主意。此雕刻是典型的单边主义和贸善维养护主义行为,违反世贸布匹局最惠国待遇等中心规则。

  18年前,世贸布匹局就已裁剪定美国“301章”法度本身与多边贸善体制不相容。偏偏鉴于美国内阁在1994年做出产的《行政举触动音皓》,才使得此雕刻壹法度避免于被裁剪违规。18年后的皓天,“301章”考查东方地脊又宗,叁灾八难的是,中国首当其冲;幸运的是,中国趾够绵软弱小。我们不由会讯问,下壹个目的会是谁呢?

  历史畅通牒我们,单边主义壹旦违反掉落制条约,将严重破开变质世界经济的摆荡性,使所拥有国度更是展开中国度讨巧。同时,它却以天天对准任何目的,中小经济体将难以孤立顶挡。

  美方贸善政策的单边主义倾向必须惹宗所拥有成员的缓急觉和坚硬定顶挡。维养护多边贸善体制是所拥有世贸成员的责,亦独壹正确的选择。

  在全球募化深募化展开的皓天,世界已经构成“你中拥有我,我中拥有你”的利更加壹道体,单边主义损人害己己。正如习近平主席指出产的,“搞维养护主义如同把己己己关进黑房儿子,看似躲度过了风吹奏雨水打,但也隔绝了阳光和空气。”

  中方期望世贸成员能携宗顺手到来,养保卫以规则为基础的多边贸善体制,也期望美方改弦更张,不要将全球拖入“贸善战”的险境。

  感谢主席先生!

  谢伊父亲使发言:

  主席先生,我们当今进入到了酷爱丽丝仙境。此雕刻边白坚硬是黑,左右倒腾度过男。世界上最具维养护主义色的重商主义经济体,却己炫为己在贸善和全球贸善体系的养保卫者,此雕刻令人惊诧。世贸布匹局必须备止跌入兔儿子洞,进入壹个梦想世界,不然该布匹局将违反掉落所拥有却信度。

  事情的本相是,中国才是单边主义者,其行为壹直在破开变质绽和公允的全球贸善体系。皓天的议程实则应当讨论以下议题:数不清的市场准入壁垒;强大迫技术让;规模绝后的知产权偷;己主花样翻新政策和“中国创造2025”方案;轻视性技术规范;父亲规模内阁补养助招致要紧产业机关临时产能度过剩;以及高限度局限性的外面资政策。假设 WTO还想僵持其存放在的靠边性,就必须即雕刻面对中国国度本钱主义所带到来的破开变质。

  此雕刻种情景使我们回到中方要寻求列入皓天会议程的301报告。

  群所周知,美方已发表发出产了近200页的详细雄心报告,包罗壹仟多个笺注,详细描绘了中国拥关于技术让的诬蔑性政策。中方没拥有拥有供任何证据到来辩批驳报告的雄心或定论,而偏偏是予以否定。该报告包罗微少量证据,却在 USTR网站上查阅。

  中方上述政策邑是什么呢?就中拥有四类主意触及技术让:

  第壹,中国经度过限度局限外面方所拥有权到来要寻求或迫使本国公司终止技术让,如要寻求合资、限度局限外面方股权以及各种行政复核和容许以次。

  此雕刻些外面资所拥有权限度局限政策要寻求本国投资者与中资企业合资,同时在某些情景下,需由中方合资人控股,不然就避免避免本国投资者在某些行业经纪。

  上述要寻求阻挡本国公司按己己己的方法进入中国市场,同时为中国强大迫技术让做了铺垫。

  中国还使用其行政容许和审批以次强大迫外面方经度过技术让到来得到在中国确立和经纪企业所需的微少量审批。

  规则的含糊和规则的不决定性,使中国内阁拥拥有极父亲的己在裁剪量权,采取行政以次到来强大迫技术让,或铰进完成其诬蔑贸善的产业政策目的。因此,我不得不讯问:此雕刻算不算是旨在舍身贸善同伙的利更加到来利己己的单边主义?

  第二,中方的技术法规强大迫欲经度过容许让技术的美国企业以匪市场环境将技术让给中资企业,使后者讨巧。

  关于想在中国展歇事情的本国企业,中方对本国出口产的技术让实施了壹系列不一规则。此雕刻些规则却不使用于中资企业对企业的技术让。

  中方对出口产本国技术的强大迫性要寻求具拥有轻视性,同时清楚高于对本国企业的要寻求。

  详细而言,中方要寻求所拥有补养偿风险由外面方技术让人担负。即苦中方技术受让人情愿担负合同风险,也不容许各方就风险分派终止交涉。

  中方还规则所拥有技术改革邑属于改革方,而外面方技术让人不能阻挡中方技术受让人改革技术。根据中国法度,中方还进壹步要寻求合资企业却以在技术容许合同实行终了后持续运用让技术。

  甚到在本国公司想要进入中国市场之前,此雕刻些限度局限主意便曾经使技术让制度倾向于中资企业。因此,我不得不讯问:此雕刻算不算是旨在舍身贸善同伙的利更加到来利己己的单边主义?

  第叁,中国直接和偏颇整顿地为中资企业体系地投资和收买进本国公司和资产供便当,以获取最上进的技术和知产权,并使其向中资企业让技术。

  国度指点和顶持此雕刻壹境外面投资战微的情景什分普遍,同时在中、地区和中型各级内阁均很清楚。

  中国供微少量资产鼓励和便当其海外面投资投向哪些中国在认为具拥有战微意思的范畴。

  为踏实此雕刻些政策,中国采取了投资审批机制和“鼓励”行业体系等器到来指伸和顶持境外面投资。

  此雕刻些投资和收买进与国度的目的和政策僵持不符,并畅通日由国拥有企业完成,而此雕刻些企业由内阁拥拥有并把持。

  即苦对外面投资的企业中并没拥有拥有却见的内阁控股,此雕刻些买进卖也日日接受国度的指点和指令。

  佩的,此雕刻些买进卖多由国拥有实体或银行供资产,而在却比较的环境下畅通日是无法得到商融资的。因此,我不得不讯问:此雕刻算不算是旨在舍身贸善同伙的利更加到来利己己的单边主义?

  第四,中国对本国公司的计算机网绕终止或顶持不经任命权的入侵和窃取,以获取敏感的商信息和商凹隐秘。

  什积年到来,针对美国公司持拥局部商凹隐秘信息,中国壹直展开并顶持网绕入侵美国商网绕。

  经度过此雕刻些网绕入侵,中国曾经得到了好多具拥有商价的商信息,带拥有商凹隐秘、技术数据、交涉立脚点以及敏感和专拥局部外面部畅通信。

  中国经度过网绕窃取和网绕入侵到来完成其战微经济目的。关于中国对美国商实体的网绕入侵案例记载与中国的产业政策目的严稠密符合。因此,我不得不讯问:此雕刻算不算是旨在舍身贸善同伙的利更加到来利己己的单边主义?

  此雕刻四项技术让政策损伤到每个成员及他们的每个行业。他们是依托技术到来护持在全球市场的竞赛力进而提高人们的生活程度。

  条是,中国不去处理己己己的破开变质性和轻视性政策,却到来指责美国“单边主义”。

  此雕刻种批完整顿没拥有靠边路。相反,我所陈列的四项政策和做法是中国实施单边主义的例儿子。此雕刻些政策和做法以舍身我们所拥有成员的利更加为代价,到来铰进完本钱身的利更加,每年对美国形成佰亿美元的经济损违反。关于世贸成员尽体形成的损违反,则是美国损违反的数倍。

  世贸布匹局并不像中国宣示的这么,鉴于某个成员采取主意去处理世贸规则无法直接收辖的拥损害贸善诬蔑政策而受到挟持。相反,对世贸布匹局结合挟持的是,中国认为世贸布匹局的存放在阻挡了任何成员采取举触动到来处理中方的偏颇允、贸善诬蔑的政策和做法,摒除匪受到 WTO争端处理的制条约。

  假设世贸布匹局被干为那些采取了能破开变质国际贸善体制公允战斗衡主意的成员的维养护伞,这么,世贸布匹局和国际贸善体制也将违反掉落民群的相信和顶持。

  (中美发言后,俄罗斯、欧盟、日本、巴基斯坦、坦桑尼亚、柬埔寨、委内瑞弹奏、古巴、玻利维亚、巴正西先后发言。)

  张向早父亲使发言:

  谢谢主席先生。

  上半天的讨论什分生厌乱。期望下半晌我们能稍稍轻松点,不然对我们新就任的同事到来说是偏颇允的,让他们壹到来就被卷入了凶烈的分辨。

  皓天上半天,美国父亲使谢伊提出产了壹个什分好的效实:什么是单边主义?他如此喜乐此雕刻个效实伸致于讯问了四遍。

  此雕刻是壹个拥有意思且要紧的效实。我们了松的单边主义是采取违反多边规则的举触动,并以舍身其他成员利更加为代价。此雕刻不虞味着单个成员采取的任何主意邑却以被贴上“单边”的标注签。每个国度邑拥有己己己的经济政策。在合法的政策当空和单边举触动之间拥有条疆界。此雕刻条疆界坚硬是我们邑赞同的多边规则。假设某项政策与世贸规则不符,这么它坚硬是合法的,不然坚硬是单边的。根据我的了松,在“301章”考查中,美国淡色上想从中国得到的是己在的市场准入。此雕刻应经度过副边投资交涉到来完成而不是皓目张胆的威逼。

  我也喜乐谢伊父亲使提到的“盾牌”此雕刻个词。我认为世贸布匹局正是成员顶挡贸善维养护主义的盾牌,而违反世贸规则的行为却无法藏身其下。世贸布匹局拥有皓晰的贸善规则,美国“301章”主意违反了此雕刻些规则,此雕刻些骈仇怨主意露然属于世贸布匹局协议的统御范畴。

  确实,如壹些同事上半天所说,世贸布匹局需寻求在某些范畴创制新规则以应对新的应敌。条是,此雕刻些新规则需寻求经度过交涉并以协商不符方法臻,而匪由某个成员单边实施。皓天上半天我说度过,中方已预备好活贸布匹局框架下与各方讨论何以使世贸布匹局规则与时俱进,以及何以更好地保障世贸成员公允靠边的利更加。

  主席先生,当今我想就中国的展开战微和知产权维养护谈几点观点。

  关于中国的展开战微,谢伊父亲使上半天给中国扣了几顶帽儿子,譬如国度本钱主义、重商主义,但我认为,把此雕刻些帽儿子扣在我们头上是什分不快宜的。

  中国鼎革绽四什年,经济得到了快快展开,面前的缘由是什么,群说纷纭。我己己己的不清雅察是,中国的展开根本上源于两条:壹是实行市场募化鼎革,假释经济主体的生命力;是融入了全球募化,绽国际市场,信守国际规则。

  中国宪法第什五条规则,中国实行社会主义市场经济。第什六条规则,国拥有企业依法己主经纪。此雕刻是鼎革绽的法度效实,亦中国不到来展开的制度保障。

  毫无疑讯问,要完成却持续和容受性的展开,中国的市场经济体制需寻求进壹步完备,国拥有企业需寻求进壹步鼎革,国际市场需寻求进壹步对外面绽,知产权的维养护需寻求进壹步增强大。

  故此,中国不到来的工干是,进壹步完备内阁办,免去国拥有企业的经纪的弊端,进壹步吊销市场准入的障碍,增强大知产权维养护。上述方面存放在的缺乏正是进壹步深募化鼎革绽的目的,而不是中国得到展开的“凹隐秘兵器”。

  主席先生,关于中国的知产权维养护,美国同事又次援用301报告干为其单边举触动的根据。此雕刻份301报告共183页,包罗1139个笺注和5个附件。我置信美国贸善代表办公室的法度团弄队为此雕刻份报告参加了很多稀神物。我观点此雕刻个团弄队里的不微少人,期望他们在沉重负政之后违反掉落壹些休憩。

  我建议世贸成员阅读此雕刻份报告,但不要把它当做床头读物,固然它的篇幅长得趾以让你成眠,但报告中的诬蔑雄心、断章取义、客不清雅臆断会使你睡意全无。

  主席先生,我顺手头拥有很微少半耳闻皓中国在维养护知产权方面得到的提高,但我皓天不想去读它们,而条想和父亲家分享壹下我团弄体的阅历。

  5年前,我干为商政部掌管知产权的部长副顺手,比值国政院督查组去甘肃、陕正西等节反节绵软件正版工干。甘肃是中国正西北边壹个偏远落后的节份,我在那边吧嗒查了壹个机关的六台计算机,结实五台邑是合格的,剩壹台也运用了正版绵软件,条是标注签贴的位置不够规范罢了。

  此雕刻个机关的担负人对我说,甘肃方阅历了壹场父亲地动,财政预算极为生厌乱。他们单位为购置正版绵软件破开费了30万元,短期内看不出产拥有什么更加处,但父亲家知道,为了久远的展开此雕刻是必需要做的。

  此雕刻么的例儿子还拥有很多。客不清雅地说,世贸布匹局《TRIPS协议》对展开中国度的要寻求是什分严苛的,但既然然我们允诺言了,将竭力去做。

  中国没拥有拥有强大迫技术让的法度,假设拥有人说拥有,请拿出产证据到来。同时,我认为任何外面力带拥有内阁邑不能强大迫技术拥拥有者以他们不能接受的环境让他们己己己认为最为宝贵的东方正西。

  我和我丈妻儿子余闲时会玩同款电脑游玩,她程度比我高,把握了畅通关秘笈,她不会给我她的秘笈,但却以帮我畅通关,环境是我给她壹定的更加处,譬如递送她壹件礼或多做壹些家政,拥偶然我认为此雕刻是壹项公允买进卖,拥偶然我也会回绝,转而依托己己己的竭力度过关。与此相像的事在中国和其他市场上每天邑在突发。

  史蒂芬·罗零数先生是前摩根士丹利亚洲区主席,异近日到体即兴,美国和其他跨国公司是己愿臻此雕刻些合法交涉的商装置排,其说辞,不单是装投身于中国快快增长的国际市场,同时还干为壹种顺手眼到来提高运营效力与中国低本钱的平台。

  关于技术让效实,展开中国度带拥有中国渴望技术提高,此雕刻是不移到理的,兴旺国度的技术拥拥有者期望经度过他们的技术权利完成财富的最父亲募化,亦不移到理的。尽先先者拥有尽先先者的权利,追逐者拥有追逐者的己在。权利拥有疆界,己在拥有限度局限。此雕刻个疆界和限度局限坚硬是世贸布匹局的规则。

  我此雕刻么说,并不否定在知产权维养护方面中国还存放在着缺乏,还愿上,我们还拥有很父亲的改革当空。企业拥有效实就让他们去中国的知产权法院控,成员内阁拥有体制性关怀就到世贸布匹局赞美,而不该该采取世贸布匹局所不容许的单边主意对其他成员终止制裁剪。

  假设我的耳朵没拥有出产效实的话,拥有人在发言中运用了“偷”此雕刻么的词。此雕刻使我想宗中国即兴代疑人偷斧的穿扦(邻舍疑斧)。此雕刻个穿扦畅通牒我们,人家不是贼,贼在你心!你丧权辱国的正是你心的壹些东方正西,带拥有对法治水的酷爱崇、卧薪尝胆大不息的妥协肉体和反躬己节的勇气。期望你能尽快找回它们,从而不又诿度过于人。

  谢伊父亲使发言:

  我收听到父亲家在小音讨论。我向主席保障我的发言不太长。

  比值先感谢向早父亲使在他的发言中叁次提到了我,此雕刻标注皓他皓天上半天详细收听了我的发言,此雕刻是壹个提高。我也想感谢向早父亲使发言最末讲的“疑人偷斧”穿扦。 但不得不说,美国相当尊敬法治水。美国家要事在法治水基础上确立宗到来的,但世界上佩的壹些中并匪尽是如此。我想,在不到来几周和几个月,我们将进壹步讨论单边主义一齐竟是什么。在此雕刻个效实上,我收听候与带拥有向早父亲使在内的即席同事终止提交流动。

  最末,美国代表团弄剩意到成员在昨天和皓天会上的发言带拥有代表展开中国度匪正式小组(IGDC)发表发出产的结合音皓。鉴于 IGDC成员结合活贸布匹局的网站上并没拥有拥有皓白信息,同时我也期望我的团弄队却以充分考虑音皓中表臻的不雅概念,期望此雕刻次的会记载能皓晰反应一齐竟是哪些世贸成员参加以了此雕刻份 IGDC音皓。

  谢谢。

  张向早父亲使发言:

  感谢主席先生。

  我拥有意持续此雕刻场分辨,但我想说,皓天的讨论什分要紧,也什分拥有利。关于贸善政策的分辨正是世贸布匹局的干用之壹让我援用亚当·斯稠密在他的著干《国富论》到来完一齐我的发言“人是却以讨价讨价的栽物:没拥有拥有其他栽物能做到此雕刻壹点,没拥有拥有狗能和佩的狗提交流动骨头。”干为贸善交涉代表,让我们彼此讨价讨价,而不是彼此撕咬。

  英文版: 5月8日日内瓦中美父亲使激辩实录

  China-US Debate on AB, 232, 301 at the WTO General Council Meeting

  Geneva, 8 May 2018

  Agenda Item4: Selection of New Appellate Body Members

  Ambassador Zhang Xiangchen:

  Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning colleagues. At the outset, I would like to bid a farewell to the Ambassadors of Sweden and Indonesia, who are leaving us. I wish them all the best in their future endeavors.

  I would also like to extend my warm welcome to our new colleagues, especially Dennis. At this critical juncture, members have expectations to you indeed. I hope your arrival could bring luck to this Organization.

  This is the first of the three Agenda Items at today’s General Council meeting that have been requested by China.

  Before proceeding to the subject matter, I would like to explain why China is requesting three agenda items at today’s General Council meeting.

  First of all, I would like to point out that, the WTO is facing grave challenges.

  As the Airgram indicates that the three agenda items China requested are Selection of New Appellate Body Members, US Section232 Investigations and Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, and US Section301 of the Trade Act of1974.

  The reason for us to focus on these issues is simple, that is, 23 years after the establishment of the WTO back in 1995, this institution is now faced with an unprecedented challenge.

  The most urgent and burning question that the WTO has to answer now is how to respond to unilateralism and protectionism.

  Before the end of the Uruguay Round, GATT contracting parties have severely suffered from the unilateral and protectionist measures. In order to curb their spread, Members have negotiated and agreed on the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes and other WTO agreements. The prohibition on unilateral and protectionist measures became the bedrock and central elements of the multilateral trading system ever since.

  However, what is most dangerous and devastating is that the US is systematically challenging these fundamental guiding principles by blocking the selection process of the Appellate Body members, applying restrictive trade measures under Section232 and threatening to impose tariff measures of 50 Billion USD of goods imports from China under Section 301 of US domestic law. Any one of these, if left untreated, will fatally undermine the functioning of the WTO. But the reality is that the WTO is currently confronted with “three hard blows” which are referred above.

  Hence, we are requesting these three items to be included in today’s meeting and we are ready to discuss ways to tackle these severe challenges with all Members.

  We earnestly expect all members to join efforts and defend our system, rules and order, defend the equal rights of all Members, and defend the dignity of the international law. In so doing, we can collectively strengthen and improve the multilateral trading system, and prevent the unilateral or protectionist actions from damaging this system and undermining international trade.

  Secondly, regarding this Agenda Item 4, I would like to point out that, the Crown Jewel of the WTO is losing its brilliance.

  The dispute settlement mechanism with its efficiency and effectiveness is widely considered to be the crown jewel of the WTO. Since1995, several hundreds of trade disputes have been settled through such mechanism. And such system has become one of the most efficient and effective dispute settlement mechanism in the history of international law. Within such system, the Appellate Body plays a vital role in ensuring the stability and predictability of the WTO system and its rules.

  Currently, the dispute settlement system is facing the most difficult time since its creation.

  Only four of the seven Appellate Body members are in office. If the selection process is not launched, the functioning of the Appellate Body will be paralyzed, which will put the entire dispute settlement system in crisis.

  Without such system, the WTO trade rules will no longer be effectively enforced, and the trust and credibility of the multilateral trading system will be deeply undermined. Ultimately, we will not be able to effectively control the unilateralism and protectionism.

  We noticed that the US has expressed for many times its concerns with respect to the WTO dispute settlement system. In our view this system functions generally well and the US is among the Members who benefitted the most from such system.

  Any concerns with respect to the system can and should be addressed by discussion under the framework of the WTO. And China is willing to engage in such discussion. However, we cannot agree to link these concerns with the selection process.

  The Member-driven mechanism does not mean that it is driven by only one single Member. By taking the selection process as a hostage, the US is abusing the decision making mechanism of consensus. We urge that the commencing of the selection process should start, so that the Appellate Body can resume its proper functioning as soon as possible.

  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

  (Interventions by EU, Mexico, Cambodia, Zimbabwe, Russia, Honduras, Uganda, Japan, Bolivia, Tanzania, Qatar, Benin, Guinea, Turkey, Norway, Hong Kong China, Brazil, Venezuela, Canada, Pakistan, Maldives, Switzerland, Australia, Myanmar, Thailand, Liberia, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, India, Sri Lanka, Guatemala, South Korea, Egypt)

  Ambassador Dennis Shea:

  The United States appreciates the opportunity afforded by this agenda item to address concerns surrounding the functioning of the WTO’s dispute settlement system in general and of the Appellate Body in particular.

  We have taken note of the expressions of concern on the part of the sponsor of this agenda item and other Members. I’m happy to have a chance to review briefly the perspectives of the United States, and I look forward to continue engaging with my colleagues on these important questions.

  Members of this organization are fond of applauding the WTO as an international paragon of the rule of law. And indeed, the WTO’s rule-book has substantial value, including for the United States, and adherence to those rules has generally contributed to global economic stability.

  But something has gone terribly wrong in this system when those charged with adjudicating the rules are so consistently disregarding those very rules. What we are dealing with, fundamentally, is a steadily worsening rupture of trust on the part of the Appellate Body. That ruptured trust has, in turn, placed in jeopardy the political sustainability of our entire dispute settlement system. Despite years of warnings from my predecessors, and expressions of concern from respected WTO voices, including former Directors-General, the Appellate Body not only has rewritten our agreements to impose new substantive rules we Members never negotiated or agreed, but has also been ignoring or rewriting the rules governing the dispute settlement system, expanding its own capacity to write and impose new rules.

  This unapproved rule-breaking and rule-making is obvious to anyone who looks honestly at how the system operates. Rules that we, as WTO Members, negotiated and approved domestically stipulate that the Appellate Body must render its decisions within 90 days there are no exceptions given. And yet the AB now almost never meets that deadline, breaking the rules without authorization from its bosses— namely, us, the Members of this Council and of the DSB. Similarly, the AB has decided that it can deem a person who “ceases to be a member of the Appellate Body” to continue to be a member, despite there being no basis whatsoever in the DSU for such actions. I could go on with examples.

  Beyond this flaunting of rules meant to govern its own activity, the Appellate Body has compiled a troubling track record of expansive interpretations that effectively create new WTO law, a function clearly reserved to Members through the process of negotiation.

  But our lack of progress in negotiations bears a strong relationship to this culture in which many Members consider that certain outcomes can be most easily achieved through litigation rather than through the hard work of negotiation.

  If the United States is now taking actions that some consider to be disruptive, it is important to understand that this comes only after many years of unheeded warnings. It is important to understand that a dispute settlement system that ignores existing rules and writes new rules undermines the WTO as a forum for negotiation and discussion. It is important to understand that dispute settlement that goes beyond existing rules has not been approved by Members and does not have democratic legitimacy or support. Our goal is to ensure that any system of dispute settlement can sustain the support of all Members. We do not see how perpetuating the existing dysfunctions through a complacent approach to the filling of Appellate Body vacancies can advance that objective.

  As I stated yesterday in our informal Heads of Delegation meeting, the United States is deeply interested in working with those other Members who share our commitment to a better, more politically sustainable, and truly Member-driven World Trade Organization. That interest applies with no greater relevance than with respect to the issue currently being discussed in this Council.

  Agenda Item 5: US Section232 Investigations and Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products

  Ambassador Zhang Xiangchen:

  Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

  China would recall its statement made at the General Council meeting on 7 March. We would reiterate our grave concern over the Section232 measures taken by the United States, because these measures are distorting trade, lacking transparency, and they are discriminatory and will severely damage the multilateral trading system and the world trade.

  Unfortunately, despite the strong objections from the Membership, the US issued presidential proclamations on the following day,8 March, deciding to impose25 percent and10 percent of additional import duty respectively on certain steel and aluminum products. These measures not only seriously impair the interests of all the exporting Members to the US, but also seriously disrupt the existing order of international trade in steel and aluminium products.

  In order to defend the legitimate rights under the WTO Agreements, as well as to safeguard the fundamental values and principles of this Organization, China requested for consultations with the US under the DSU on 5 April.

  The purpose of the Section232 measures by the US against steel and aluminium products according to our understanding is not to protect so-called “national security” of the US, but rather it serves to protect the commercial interests of the domestic industries. As such, such measure should be considered as safeguard measures under the Agreement on Safeguards, and meet necessary requirements as set in that agreement.

  According to the report by the US Department of Commerce and statistics provided by the US Department of Defense, it is obvious that the reason of these measures is not “national security”.

  The steel used by the US defense industry only accounts for 3% of the domestic steel consumption of the US, while the output of the US steel industry equals to 84% of its domestic consumption, that is, roughly28 times of its defense demand.

  On the other hand, the US import of steel accounts for around16% of its consumption, and about 70% of its import comes from the Members exempted, temporarily or permanently, from the Section 232 measure.

  That means the imports subject to the restriction of the Section232 measure on steel accounts for only 5% of the steel consumption of the US. It was not mentioned at all whether these restricted imports are related with the US defense industries.

  Here my question is, why these imports, which accounts for merely 5% of US consumption and are mostly ordinary mid-and-low end products, will threaten the “national security” of the US?

  If steel and aluminium products will affect so called “national security”, can anyone find any group of products- from agricultural products to minerals, from textiles to high-tech products- that have no linkage with “national security”?

  If an import of ordinary steel and aluminum products which equals to 5% of the domestic market is a threat to the “national security”, we can only assume that it is a very precarious security for a super power, and what proportion of imports is “safe” to national security?

  If it’s justifiable to raise tariffs according to such “national security” investigations, are the WTO Schedules of Concessions still binding?

  We further noticed that the United States is seeking quotas or voluntary export restraints, which are explicitly prohibited by the WTO rules.

  It is reported that Mr. Peter Navarro, the White House Trade Assistant, said on 1 May that “any country, or entity like the EU, which is exempted from the tariffs, will have a quota and other restrictions which are necessary to defend the aluminum and steel industries from imports in defense of our national security.

  This is obviously violating the WTO rules. And this is back-tracking the train of history, and simply puts the global trade back to the old era of quotas.

  Here, China would call on the whole Membership to urge the US to honour its obligations under the WTO Agreements and to immediately withdraw its Section232 measures, so that the normal order of international trade can be restored.

  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

  Ambassador Dennis Shea:

  Mr. Chairman, the United States finds it curious that China has asked to place this item on the agenda for today’s meeting.

  For, in fact, we would not find ourselves in the current juncture were in not for China’s own self-interested policy of contributing to massive global overcapacity in steel and aluminum. This policy has been carried out over a period of many years, without regard to global impacts, and China has responded to mounting concerns with considerable talk but not much action.

  Against this backdrop, we are perplexed that China now asserts its status as a victim. In any event, I am happy to have this opportunity to recall to Members’ attention the reasons underlying the United States’ defense of critical national security interests.

  The United States has previously informed Members about the proclamations issued by the President pursuant to Section232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended.

  I won’t repeat our previous intervention on this issue, but will refer Members to our statement at the Council for Trade in Goods meeting on March23— a statement we provided consistent with the Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement taken by the GATT Council on 30 November1982.

  Certain Members have since sought consultations with the United States with regard to the President’s proclamations. Those Members have our responses.

  We note the attempt by some Members to cast the President’s actions in terms that suit their desire to pursue a particular WTO recourse. These attempts are without valid foundation and we will not entertain them.

  We are, however, willing to discuss with any Member questions they may have about the President’s actions, as well as the circumstances of pernicious state intervention, market distortion, and massive and persistent overcapacity in certain economies that necessitated the actions.

  The President issued the Steel and Aluminum Proclamations pursuant to Section232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, determining that tariffs are necessary to adjust imports of steel and aluminum articles that threaten to impair the national security of the United States.

  The United States did not take action pursuant to Section201 of the Trade Act of1974, which is the law under which the United States imposes safeguard measures. And as evidenced by our recent notifications with respect to solar products and large residential washers, the United States is well aware of what constitutes a safeguard as well as what its notification obligations are under the Agreement on Safeguards.

  Moreover, Article12.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards states that a “Member proposing to apply or extend a safeguard measure shall provide adequate opportunity for prior consultations” with Members having a substantial interest in exports of the product concerned. However, the United States is not “proposing to apply or extend a safeguard measure” with respect to steel or aluminum and, therefore, Article12.3 does not apply and China’s requests for consultations pursuant to Article12.3, like its initial characterization of the tariffs, have no basis in the Agreement on Safeguards.

  Because the steel and aluminum actions are not safeguard measures, the United States considers that Article8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards does not justify China’s suspension of concessions or other obligations. China has asserted no other justification for its measures, and the United States is aware of none. Therefore, it appears that China’s actions have no basis under WTO rules.

  (Interventions by South Africa, Russia, Brazil, Uganda, Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Japan, Qatar, Pakistan, Cambodia, EU, Turkey, Switzerland, Hong Kong China, India, Norway)

  Ambassador Zhang Xiangchen (Second Intervention):

  Thank you Mr. Chairman. I’m sorry to take the floor again. I would like to make a comment on the relationship between Section232 measures and overcapacity and to make our discussion more interactive. But before that, let me briefly react with two points.

  First, on the nature of Section232 measures.

  From the investigation report by the US Department of Commerce and the Presidential Proclamation on the steel and aluminium Section232 measures, we could find a clear inherent logic: the continued growth of imported products has allegedly caused serious injury to domestic industries, and therefore it is necessary to raise tariffs against imports from all over the world.

  Such logic, according to our understanding, complies with the definition and conditions for implementing safeguard measures stipulated in Article19 of the GATT1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards.

  Second, on China’s suspension of concession measures.

  According to Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article19.3 of the GATT1994, because a delay would cause irreversible damages, China notified the Council for Trade in Goods on 29 March and implemented suspension of concessions on 2 April.

  In terms of substantial aspect, China strictly follows the provisions of Article8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards that the suspension of concessions should be “substantially equivalent” to safeguard measures. The measures we took are symmetrical and restrained.

  Mr. Chairman, China raised the issue of section232 measures not for our own self-interest, but for the interest of the system.

  However, it seems that someone has attempted to sell a flawed logic that trade protection is a response to overcapacity, and overcapacity is caused by the intervention and subsidies of the Chinese government. Therefore, it is China’s responsibility to address the issue of overcapacity.

  Why I said this logic is a flawed one? Overall, China is at the middle and low end of the global value chain. To a large extent, China’s production is determined by the others from the multinational corporations, and China produces, assembles products according to the demand in the international market. Since 2008, Chinese government has adopted proactive fiscal and monetary policies, expanded investment, in order to mitigate the shock wave of the global financial crisis. China has made significant contribution and its efforts were praised by many countries. A decade from then, as soon as some countries stepped onto the path of recovery, they seem to have quickly put that history behind. It now becomes China’s problem to absorb increased capacity, which is essentially the product of stimulus policies in response to the financial crisis. Chinese government and people now bear tremendous adjustment pains. Tens of thousands of workers have lost their jobs. Nevertheless, we are doing what we can do to reduce excess capacity.

  China stands ready to discuss with other Members within the framework of the WTO on how to keep the WTO rules more adaptable to the new situation, and on how to better safeguard a fair and reasonable international trade order.

  However, we do not agree to arbitrarily throw several “hats” onto China and describe China’s strategy as distorting the world market, because this is completely not true and will make China a wrong target in the current situation when trade protectionism is prevalent.

  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

  Agenda Item 6: US Section301 of the Trade Act of 1974

  Ambassador Zhang Xiangchen:

  Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

  I assume that the WTO members are not unfamiliar with something called Section301 of the1974 Trade Act of the United States.

  In fact, since its enactment in1974, as many as 125 investigations have been launched by the United States against 35 countries and regions around the world. This is not an ancient history. Many of us still have fresh memory of the devastations caused by these investigations.

  Let us also refresh our memories that the United States has “explicitly, officially, repeatedly and unconditionally confirmed” its commitments undertaken in its 1994 Statement of Administrative Action(SAA) that it would base a Section301 decision only on adopted DSB findings. Otherwise, “the US would incur state responsibility since its law would be rendered inconsistent with the obligations under DSU Article23.”

  Today, the US seems to have forgotten these commitments by announcing the massive unilateral tariffs against China. It is a typical unilateral and protectionist action, which manifests an intentional and gross violation of the WTO’s fundamental principle of non-discrimination.

  18 years ago, the DSB adopted a clear finding that Section301 is prima facie incompatible with the multilateral trading system. It was the 1994 SAA that saved the US law from being ruled as a violation of the WTO rules.

  18 years later, Section301 is coming back. It is unfortunate that China is picked as the first target, but fortunately China is big and strong enough.

  We are wondering, who is the next target?

  History teaches us that if the unilateralism is unrestrained, it would bring destruction to the world economy and rip all members, especially the developing countries. Anybody at any time can be its target, and nobody, especially the small and medium economies, can defend themselves on their own.

  The unilateral tendency of the US’s trade policy shall be of serious concern of all Members and shall be firmly rejected. To do so is not just our responsibility, but also the only right way to cope with it.

  Today, the globalization has made us increasingly interdependent and forming a community of shared interests. Any unilateral action would injure others and ruin itself. As our President Xi Jinping has rightly pointed out in Davos, “pursuing protectionism is just like locking oneself in a dark room: wind and rain might be kept outside but so are light and air”.

  China is expecting all members to join hands together and to collectively safeguard the rules-based multilateral trading system, and we urge the US to change its course of unilateral practice and avoid dragging the world into a trade war.

  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

  Ambassador Dennis Shea:

  Mr. Chairman, we have now entered the realm of Alice in Wonderland. White is black. Up is down. It is amazing to watch a country that is the world’s most protectionist, mercantilist economy position itself as the self-proclaimed defender of free trade and the global trading system. The WTO must avoid falling down this rabbit hole into a fantasy world, lest it lose all credibility.

  The truth is, it is China that is the unilateralist, consistently acting in ways that undermine the global system of open and fair trade. Market access barriers too numerous to mention; forced technology transfers; intellectual property theft on an unprecedented scale; indigenous innovation policies and the Made in China 2025 program; discriminatory use of technical standards; massive government subsidies that have led to chronic overcapacity in key industrial sectors; and a highly restrictive foreign investment regime- these are the issues that should be on today’s agenda. If the WTO wishes to remain relevant, it must— with urgency- confront the havoc created by China’s state capitalism.

  This brings me to the Section301 report that China has asked to be reflected on today’s agenda.

  As Members are aware, the United States has issued a detailed factual report running nearly 200 pages with more than one thousand one hundred footnotes that details China’s distortive policies on technology transfer. China has not provided any evidence to refute the report’s facts or conclusions, only mere denials. The report, containing extensive evidence, is available on the USTR website.

  What are these policies? There are four types of practices involving technology transfer:

  First, China uses foreign ownership restrictions, such as joint venture requirements and foreign equity limitations, and various administrative review and licensing processes, to require or pressure technology transfer from foreign companies.

  These foreign ownership restrictions prohibit foreign investors from operating in certain industries unless they partner with a Chinese company, and in some cases, unless the Chinese partner is the controlling shareholder.

  These requirements preclude foreign companies from entering the market on their own terms, and lay the foundation for China to require or pressure the transfer of technology.

  China also uses its administrative licensing and approvals processes to force technology transfer in exchange for the numerous approvals needed to establish and operate a business in China.

  Vague provisions and uncertainty about the applicable rules provide Chinese authorities with wide discretion to use administrative processes to pressure technology transfer or otherwise act in furtherance of China’s trade-distorting industrial policy objectives. And so I am compelled to ask: is this unilateralism designed to benefit China at the expense of its trading partners?

  Second, China’s regime of technology regulations forces U.S. companies seeking to license technologies to Chinese entities to do so on non-market-based terms that favor Chinese recipients.

  China imposes a different set of rules for imported technology transfers originating from outside China, such as from foreign entities attempting to do business in China. These rules do not apply to technology transfers occurring between two domestic Chinese companies.

  China’s mandatory requirements for importation of foreign technology are discriminatory and clearly more burdensome than the requirements applicable to domestic Chinese companies.

  Specifically, China mandates that all indemnity risks be borne by the foreign technology transferor. Parties cannot negotiate the allocation of this risk, even if the transferee would be willing to bear the risk under the contract.

  China also mandates that all improvements belong to the party making the improvement and that a foreign licensor cannot stop the Chinese licensee from making improvements to the technology. China further requires that joint ventures, mandated under Chinese law, may continue to use transferred technology after the conclusion of any licensing contract.

  These restrictions tip the technology transfer regime in favor of Chinese entities before a foreign company even attempts to enter the market in China. And so I am compelled to ask: is this unilateralism designed to benefit China at the expense of its trading partners?

  Third, China directs and unfairly facilitates the systematic investment in, and acquisition of, foreign companies and assets by Chinese companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies and intellectual property and generate the transfer of technology to Chinese companies.

  The role of the state in directing and supporting this outbound investment strategy is pervasive and evident at multiple levels of government— central, regional, and local.

  China has devoted massive amounts of financing to encourage and facilitate outbound investment in areas it deems strategic.

  To implement these policies, China employs tools such as investment approval mechanisms and a system of “encouraged” sectors to channel and support outbound investment.

  These investments and acquisitions align with state objectives and policies, and are often undertaken by state-owned enterprises that are, by definition, owned and controlled by the government.

  Even when undertaken by companies in which the government does not own an observable controlling stake, these transactions are frequently guided and directed by the state.

  In addition, many of these transactions are funded by state-owned entities or banks, often in situations where comparable commercial financing would have been unavailable. And so I am compelled to ask: is this unilateralism designed to benefit China at the expense of its trading partners?

  Fourth, China conducts and supports unauthorized intrusions into, and theft from, the computer networks of foreign companies to access their sensitive commercial information and trade secrets.

  For over a decade, China has conducted and supported cyber intrusions into U.S. commercial networks, targeting confidential business information held by U.S. firms.

  Through these cyber intrusions, China has gained unauthorized access to a wide range of commercially-valuable business information, including trade secrets, technical data, negotiating positions, and sensitive and proprietary internal communications.

  China has used cyber-enabled theft and cyber intrusions to serve its strategic economic objectives. Documented incidents of China’s cyber intrusions against U.S. commercial entities align closely with China’s industrial policy objectives. And so I am compelled to ask: is this unilateralism designed to benefit China at the expense of its trading partners?

  These four technology transfer policies harm every Member, and every industry in every Member, that relies on technology for maintaining competitiveness in world markets and increasing its people’s standard of living.

  Instead of addressing its damaging and discriminatory policies, China accuses the United States of “unilateralism.”

  This criticism has absolutely no validity. To the contrary, the four policies and practices I have outlined are examples of unilateralism by China, advancing its own interests at the expense of all of ours, and causing economic harm worth tens of billions of dollars annually to the United States, and multiples of that to WTO Members collectively.

  The WTO system is not threatened— as China claims— where a Member takes steps to address harmful, trade distorting policies not directly covered by WTO rules. To the contrary, what does threaten the WTO is that China is asserting that the mere existence of the WTO prevents any action by any Member to address its unfair, trade-distorting practices and policies— unless those policies are currently subject to WTO dispute settlement.

  If the WTO is seen as a shield protecting those Members that choose to adopt policies that can be shown to undermine the fairness and balance of the international trading system, then the WTO and the international trading system will lose all credibility and support among our citizens.

  (Interventions by Russia, EU, Japan, Cambodia, Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Brazil, Pakistan, Tanzania)

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

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